摘要：本文考察上市公司聘用前监管部门离任官员对公司违规行为的影响。基于手工收集的高管的监管经历和公司违规数据，研究发现公司高管的监管经历显著降低了公司 的违规行为。研究结果支持“治理改善”假说，有监管经历的高管在加入受监管公司后，能帮助公司降低盈余管理的程度。进一步分析表明，在有会计违规行为以及高管曾在监管机构任较高职位的公司中，上述效应更为显著。基于中组部“18号文”这一外生政策冲击控制研究中可能的内生性，结果依然稳健。本研究为更好地理解公司违规行为、促进公司治理提供了政策建议。

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of the employment of former regulators by listed companies on the corporate fraud. Based on hand-collected data on executives' regulatory experience and the corporate fraud, we find that executives' regulatory experience significantly reduces the corporate fraud. The findings support the governance improvement hypothesis, that executives with regulatory experience can help companies reduce the degree of earnings management. Further analyses show that these effects are more stronger in companies with accounting fraud and executives who had held senior positions in regulators. Using the quasi-natural experiment of the exogenous policy of "Document No. 18" issued by the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, the results are robust. This study provides policy recommendations for better understanding corporate fraud and promoting corporate governance.