摘要：以手工收集的2009—2018年中国197个地级市中院院长更替数据匹配沪深A股上市公司的违规数据，实证检验发现司法官员更替通过提高司法公正性和司法效率，产生“威慑效应”，在短期内降低了公司违规的概率、严重程度及频率。此外，区分公司违规类型后发现，司法官员更替只对公司经营性违规和信息披露违规具有抑制作用，对领导人违规影响不显著。区分司法官员的个人特征后发现，当中院院长来源于上级部门或其他政法部门时，抑制作用更显著。区分样本公司的特征后发现，公司属于管制行业、董事会会议频率较高时，司法官员更替对公司违规的抑制作用更显著。本研究丰富了法与金融领域的文献，提供了影响公司违规行为的新证据，对加强公司外部治理具有重要的政策启示。

Abstract: Using the data of the turnover of the presidents of the Intermediate People's Court in 197 prefecture-level cities in China from 2009 to 2018 to match the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies, the empirical findings show that the turnover of judicial officials improves the quality and effectiveness of the judicial system, improves the judicial environment, and reduces the probability,severity and frequency of corporate violations in the short term through the "deterrence effect". This result is still significant after a series of robustness tests. In addition, after distinguishing the types of corporate frauds, it is found that the turnover of judicial officers only has an inhibitory effect on the corporate operating frauds and information disclosure frauds, and has no significant impact on leaders' frauds. After distinguishing the personal characteristics of judicial leaders, it is found that the inhibitory effect is more significant when the president of the middle court comes from a higher-level department or other political and legal departments. After distinguishing the characteristics of the sample companies, it is found that when the company belongs to a regulated industry and the frequency of board meetings is high, the turnover of judicial officers has a more significant inhibitory effect on corporate frauds. This study enriches the literature in the fields of law and finance,provides new evidence that affects corporate frauds,and has important policy implications for strengthening corporate external governance.