摘要：实际控制人的战略行为对企业国际化战略有重大影响。本文以此为切入点，利用2008—2021年发生过对外直接投资的沪深两市A股上市公司为研究对象，从掏空与支持理论视角探讨了两权分离度对中国企业海外进入模式选择的影响。研究结果显示：两权分离度与进入模式选择之间呈现U形关系，即当两权分离程度较小时，支持效应的减弱占据主导地位，实际控制人倾向于选择合资模式；当两权分离超过一定程度后，掏空效应的增加占据主导地位，实际控制人倾向于选择独资模式。薄弱的制度环境为实际控制人掏空企业创造了条件，也抑制了实际控制人支持企业的意愿，故东道国制度风险越高，两权分离度与进入模式选择之间的U形关系越陡峭；独立董事对实际控制人的掏空行为具有监督效应，同时也会激励实际控制人支持企业的长期发展，因此董事会独立性越强，两权分离度与进入模式选择之间的U形关系越平坦。本文为理解新兴市场企业海外进入模式选择提供了新的理论视角，为政府有效监管实际控制人战略行为提供了一定的理论依据。

Abstract: The strategic behavior of actual controller has a significant impact on firms' international strategy. Based on this, this paper takes Chinese A-listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges that undertake outward foreign direct investment as the sample and explores the relationship between the degree of the separation of ownership and control and foreign market entry mode choice from the perspective of tunneling and propping theory. The results show that there is a U-shaped relationship between the degree of the separation of ownership and control and entry mode choice, that is, when the degree of separation of ownership and control is low, the decrease of propping effect dominates and actual controllers tend to choose the joint venture; when the separation of ownership and control exceeds a certain degree, the increase of tunneling effect dominates and actual controllers tend to choose the wholly-owned subsidiary. The weak institutional environment creates conditions for actual controllers to tunnel firms and also inhibits their willingness to prop up firms. Therefore, the higher the host country institutional risk the steeper the U-shaped relationship. Independent directors have a supervisory effect on the tunneling behaviors of actual controllers and also encourage them to support firms' long-term development. Therefore, board independence can flatten the U-shaped relationship. This paper provides a new theoretical perspective for understanding the entry mode choice of emerging market firms, and a certain theoretical basis for the government to effectively supervise the strategic behavior of actual controller.