摘要：在线直播凭借较强的实时互动性和真实性被广泛应用于产品销售中。基于Nash博弈的霍特林模型，本文以两个竞争品牌商为研究对象，构建了竞争品牌商引入在线直播的决策博弈模型。考虑到信息有效性和主播带货能力等因素对消费者行为以及企业决策的影响，本文运用博弈分析的方法，探讨了竞争品牌商引入在线直播的均衡策略。研究发现：当主播的带货能力很弱(强)时，品牌商们均不会(会)引入在线直播。当主播的带货能力适中时，竞争品牌商是否引入在线直播取决于信息的有效性和支付给主播的佣金。此外，随着消费者通过直播销售(常规销售)方式获得的产品信息有效性提高，品牌商们引入(不引入)在线直播的意愿会愈发强烈。

Abstract: Live-streaming, leveraging its strong real-time interactivity and authenticity, is widely applied in product sales. Based on the Hotelling model with a Nash equilibrium framework, this paper takes two competing sellers as the research subjects and constructs a decision-making game model for these sellers to introduce live-streaming selling. Considering the impacts of some factors, such as the information validity on consumer behavior and the influence of streamers' sales capabilities, on consumer behavior and firms' decisions, this paper employs game theory analysis to explore the equilibrium strategies for competing sellers to introduce live-streaming. The results show that when the streamer's ability to sell is very weak(strong), all sellers will forgo(introduce) live-streaming selling; when the streamer's ability to sell is moderate, their strategies depend on the informativeness of selling methods and the commission fee paid to the streamer. In addition, as the informativeness of live-streaming/traditional selling increases, sellers are more willing to introduce/forgo live-stream.