摘要：本文以2012—2022年沪深A股战略性新兴产业国有混改公司为样本，实证分析与检验了控股股东持股比例和监事会监管激励对公司投资效率的影响。研究发现：第一，控股股东持股比例越高，公司投资效率越低。当高管团队风险偏好特征倾向于风险寻求型时，控股股东持股比例与公司投资效率之间的负向关系被显著促进。而随着混合所有制改革程度的提高，控股股东持股比例与公司投资效率之间的负向关系被有效抑制。第二，进一步分析发现，高管团队风险偏好特征与公司股权混合度产生的联合调节作用，能够抑制控股股东持股比例对公司投资效率产生的负面效应，最终对公司投资效率的提升产生显著影响。第三，持股监事人数与监事会规模之比越大，公司投资效率越高；监事会成员年度货币薪酬总额与高管团队年度货币薪酬总额之比对公司投资效率提升并无显著影响。

Abstract: Based on the samples of state-controlled mixed-ownership companies in Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share strategic emerging industries from 2012 to 2022, empirically analyzes and tests the influence of the shareholding ratio of the controlling shareholder and the supervisory board regulatory incentives on company's investment efficiency. The results show that: first, the higher the shareholding ratio of the controlling shareholder, the lower the investment efficiency of the company, and the more significant the above effect is when the risk preference characteristics of the senior management team are more inclined to the risk-seeking type, and with the improvement of the degree of mixed ownership reform, the above effect will be effectively inhibited, which will help to improve the investment efficiency of the company. Second, further analysis finds that the joint moderating effect of the risk preference characteristics of the senior management team and the company's equity mix can inhibit the negative effect of the controlling shareholder's shareholding ratio on the company's investment efficiency, and ultimately have a significant impact on the improvement of the company's investment efficiency. Third, the ratio of the number of shareholding supervisors to the size of the board of supervisors is larger; the ratio of the total annual monetary remuneration of the members of the board of supervisors to the total annual monetary remuneration of the senior management team has no significant impact on the improvement of the company's investment efficiency.