摘要：基于2008—2022年中国沪深A股上市公司样本，实证考察了管理层在职消费与企业慈善捐赠之间的关系。结果表明，在职消费显著增加了企业的慈善捐赠规模，这一结果在非国有企业、非高科技企业、低市场竞争和弱法制环境中更为显著。机制分析表明，管理层在职消费提高了企业的信息不对称水平，并加剧了企业的经营风险，表明企业内部信息不对称是管理者利用慈善捐赠掩饰风险的前提，风险管理是管理者提高企业慈善捐赠水平的目的。进一步研究发现，组织的冗余资源以及媒体关注压力强化了管理层在职消费与企业慈善捐赠的正向关系，表明可支配资源是管理者利用慈善捐赠实施风险管理的基础，外部关注压力未抑制管理层的代理行为，出于管理层风险管理需要，企业慈善捐赠水平相对更高。

Abstract: Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2022, this study empirically examines the relationship between managerial perk and corporate philanthropic donations. The results indicate that managerial perk significantly increases the amount of corporate philanthropic donations, with this effect being more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises, non-high-tech enterprises, markets with low competition, and environments with weak legal frameworks. Mechanism analysis reveals that managerial perk elevates the level of information asymmetry within the company and exacerbates operational risks, suggesting that information asymmetry is a prerequisite for leveraging philanthropic donations to mask risks, and the need for risk management is the purpose for managers to increase corporate philanthropic donations. Further research finds that organizational redundant resources and media oversight pressure reinforce the positive relationship between managerial perk and corporate philanthropic donations, indicating that discretionary resources serve as the foundation for managers to implement risk management through philanthropic donations, while strong external regulatory pressure does not suppress managerial agency behavior. Driven by the managerial need for risk management, corporate philanthropic donation levels are higher. This study provides theoretical insights for scholars to investigate philanthropic donations from a risk management perspective.