摘要：作为资本市场健康发展的制度基石，信息披露是维护投资者尤其是中小投资者合法权益的重要保障。基于“上海证券交易所强制要求沪市相关行业上市公司按季度披露经营数据”这一政策变化，构建渐进双重差分模型分析季度经营信息披露对大股东掏空行为的影响。研究发现，季度经营信息披露有效抑制了民营上市公司的大股东掏空行为，且该结论在经过一系列稳健性检验后仍然成立。基于内部治理结构的异质性检验结果表明，季度经营信息披露对大股东掏空行为的治理效应在控制权与现金流权分离、管理层持股比例较低和内部控制质量较差的公司中更强；基于外部治理环境的异质性检验结果表明，当公司被分析师或媒体关注较少、所在地区市场化程度较低时，季度经营信息披露抑制大股东掏空行为的效果更好。机制分析发现，季度经营信息披露能够通过提高会计信息质量对大股东掏空行为形成治理效应。本文不仅拓展了季度经营信息披露经济后果和大股东掏空行为影响因素的相关研究，还为进一步完善信息披露制度、保护中小投资者合法权益等提供了参考。

Abstract: As the institutional cornerstone for the healthy development of the capital market, information disclosure serves as an important guarantee for safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of investors, particularly small and medium-sized investors. From December 2013 to December 2016, Shanghai Stock Exchange issued a series of industrial information disclosure guidelines, mandating that listed firms in relevant industries disclose operating information on a quarterly basis. Based on the policy change, this study constructs a difference-in-differences model to examine the impact of quarterly operational information disclosure on the tunneling behavior of large shareholders. The findings indicate that quarterly operational information disclosure effectively inhibits large shareholders' tunneling behavior in private listed firms. This conclusion remains robust even after conducting a series of rigorous tests, including parallel trend tests, placebo tests, and propensity score matching. The heterogeneity analysis based on internal governance structures reveals that the governance effect of quarterly operational information disclosure on large shareholders' tunneling behavior is stronger in firms with separated control rights and cash flow rights, lower management ownership ratios, and poorer internal control quality. The heterogeneity analysis based on external governance environments shows that the inhibitory effect of quarterly operational information disclosure on large shareholders' tunneling behavior is stronger in firms with less analyst coverage, less media attention, and lower levels of marketization in their respective regions. Mechanism analysis indicates that quarterly operational information disclosure exerts governance effects on large shareholders' tunneling behavior through the pathway of enhancing the quality of accounting information. In theory, this study enriches the theoretical understanding of the economic consequences of quarterly operational information disclosure and the influencing factors of large shareholders' tunneling behavior. In practice, it provides policy implications for relevant authorities to further improve information disclosure systems and protect the legitimate rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors.