摘要：保兑仓融资模式的发展为缓解中小企业的资金约束开辟了新的途径，但保兑仓融资模式的参与企业之间既存在合作，也存在冲突，因此，如何通过设计有效的激励机制实现其交易决策的优化是学术界研究的重要课题。通过建立回购和销售奖惩联合契约的保兑仓交易决策模型可知，回购与销售奖惩联合契约的运用能提升保兑仓参与企业的整体利润水平，并且通过批发价、银行利率、奖惩参数的设置，不仅销售商可以实现最优的订货量，供应商也可以把销售商的订货量控制在一个合理的范围内，降低回购风险。算例的仿真结果进一步验证了回购和销售奖惩联合契约对于供应链参与企业的交易决策具有明显的优化作用。

Abstract: The majority of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are concentrated in the upstream and downstream of the supply chain, which is the most dynamic part of the real economy. However, the difficulty of financing is an important obstacle to its development. The development of confirmed warehouse financing mode has opened up a new way to alleviate the capital constraints of SMEs. However, there are both cooperation and conflict among the participating enterprises in the confirmed warehouse financing mode. Therefore, how to optimize their trading decisions by designing an effective incentive mechanism is one of the important topics in academic research. In the confirmed warehouse financing mode, through the joint use of repurchase contract and sales rebate-penalty (SRP) contract, suppliers can control the seller's order quantity within a reasonable range through parameter design and effectively control their own risks. At the same time, simulation example shows that the joint contract of repurchase and sales rebate-penalty has an obvious optimization effect on the trading decision of the supply chain participating enterprises. That is, it can not only improve the overall profit level of the supply chain enterprises, but also realize the optimal interest rate decision of the bank, the optimal order decision of the seller and the optimal pricing decision of the supplier.