摘要：家族企业作为国民经济的重要组成部分，是推动经济发展的中流砥柱。随着数字化时代的到来，数字化转型对于家族企业实现永续传承具有重要意义，但是目前家族企业却呈现出转型滞后的现实困境。究其根源，在于家族企业所特有的“高能力-低意愿”悖论，即家族控制权集中赋予企业强大的资源调配与自主决策能力，却因对社会情感财富的保护而形成风险规避倾向，抑制了转型意愿，阻碍了其数字化进程。因此理清家族企业怎样在“保留能力”的同时“激活意愿”对其实现数字化转型具有重要的理论意义与现实意义。高管团队权力均衡分布作为关键治理安排，为破解这一悖论提供了理论路径。本文基于2010—2024年沪深A股上市家族企业样本，实证检验高管团队权力均衡分布对数字化转型的影响效应及其作用机制与调节效应。研究发现：高管团队权力均衡分布(保留能力)不仅可以显著促进我国家族企业数字化转型，而且可以通过提升企业风险承担水平(激活意愿),促进家族企业数字化转型；非创始人CEO可以强化权力均衡分布对企业风险承担的正向作用，进而间接强化其对数字化转型的促进效应。本文从家族与非家族高管权力分布这一双重视角提出可以通过权力均衡分布适当降低家族企业的自由裁量权，这能够在维持家族企业能力的同时，提升家族企业的数字化转型意愿。研究结论不仅为家族企业治理走向专业化和现代化提供了理论支撑，而且有利于打破“能力-意愿”悖论，为提升家族企业数字化转型水平提供了有力的证据。

Abstract: As an important component of the national economy, family business is the backbone driving economic development. With the advancement of the digital era, digital transformation holds significant importance for the sustainable succession of family business. However, currently, family business faces the practical dilemma of lagging in transformation. The root cause lies in the unique “high capability-low willingness” paradox of family business—concentrated family control grants enterprises strong resource allocation and autonomous decision-making capabilities, but the protection of socioemotional wealth leads to a risk-averse tendency, suppressing their willingness to transform, which hinders their digitalization process. Therefore, clarifying how family business can “activate willingness” while “retaining capability” holds both theoretical and practical significance. The balanced distribution of power within the to management team(TMT), as a key governance arrangement, provides a theoretical pathway to resolve this paradox. Based on a sample of family businesses listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2010 to 2024, this paper empirically examines the effect of TMT power balance on digital transformation, its mechanisms, and moderating effects. The study finds that the balanced distribution of power within the TMT(retaining capability) not only significantly promotes the digital transformation of Chinese family business, but also facilitates digital transformation by increasing the enterprise's risk-taking level(activating willingness). A non-founder CEO can strengthen the positive effect of power balance on enterprise risk-taking, thereby indirectly enhancing its promotion of digital transformation. From the dual perspective of family and non-family executive power balance, this paper proposes that appropriately reducing the discretionary power of family business through power balance can maintain family capabilities while enhancing their willingness for digital transformation. This not only helps to break the “capability-willingness” paradox of family business innovation, providing strong evidence for improving the level of digital transformation, but also offers theoretical support for the professionalization and modernization of family business governance, with practical significance for the management of family business.