摘要：环境监管随机抽查制度是我国环境监管执法的重要创新举措，但其真实执行效果如何仍需进一步论证。本文以2010—2023年我国沪深A股重污染行业上市公司为研究样本，基于环境监管随机抽查制度的准自然实验，实证检验环境监管执法效力提升对企业漂绿行为的影响。研究发现，环境监管随机抽查制度显著降低了重点排污名单企业的漂绿水平。机制检验表明，该制度主要通过两条路径抑制企业漂绿，一是改善企业环境信息披露质量，抑制其环境信息粉饰下的漂绿动机；二是提高企业绿色创新水平，缓解其环境治理行为掩饰下的漂绿倾向。信息环境层面的异质性分析表明，环境监管随机抽查制度的积极作用在信息环境较差如内部控制水平较低和分析师关注度较低的样本中更为显著；外部监督层面异质性分析则揭示，此类随机抽查制度的正面影响在外部监督较弱如政府和公众环保关注度较低的样本中更为明显。本文的研究不仅有助于加深对环境监管随机抽查制度实施效果的认识，为我国环境监管创新举措的有效性提供了经验证据，也从监管执法效力视角丰富了企业漂绿行为治理的相关研究。因此，生态环境执法部门要持续推进和完善环境监管随机抽查制度，充分发挥该制度在推动企业环境治理方面的积极效果。在环境监管举措日益完善的现实背景下，企业一方面应强化环境治理投资、减少在此方面的投机行为，另一方面则应重视内控制度建设以及与信息中介如分析师的沟通，从而让外界更好地了解其采取的环境治理举措以降低监管遵从成本。此外，地方政府应提高对环境治理的重视程度和调动公众力量，积极推进生态环境现代化建设进程。 

Abstract: The environmental random inspection policy represents a significant innovative measure in China's environmental regulatory enforcement. However, its actual implementation outcomes require further validation. This study employs a quasi-natural experiment design based on China's environmental regulatory random inspection system to examine how enhanced enforcement effectiveness of environmental regulation influences corporate greenwashing behavior, utilizing a sample of listed companies in high-pollution industries on China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2010 to 2023. Findings reveal that the random inspection system significantly reduces greenwashing levels among enterprises on the key polluter list. Mechanism tests indicate the system curbs greenwashing primarily through two pathways: first, by improving the quality of corporate environmental disclosures, thereby suppressing greenwashing motives masked by embellished environmental information; second, by enhancing corporate green innovation levels, mitigating greenwashing tendencies concealed by environmental governance actions. Heterogeneity analysis at the information environment level indicates that the positive effects of the random inspection system are more pronounced in samples with poorer information environments, such as those with weaker internal controls and lower analyst attention. Similarly, heterogeneity analysis at the external oversight level reveals that the beneficial impacts of such random inspection system are more evident in samples with weaker external supervision, such as those with lower environmental awareness from government and public. This research not only deepens understanding of the implementation outcomes of random environmental inspection systems, providing empirical evidence for the effectiveness of China's environmental regulatory innovations, but also enriches studies on corporate greenwashing governance from the perspective of regulatory enforcement effectiveness. Consequently, environmental enforcement agencies should continue to advance and refine the random inspection system for environmental oversight, fully leveraging its positive impact on promoting corporate environmental governance. Against the backdrop of increasingly sophisticated environmental regulatory measures, enterprises should, on the one hand, strengthen environmental governance investments and reduce speculative behavior in this area. On the other hand, they should prioritise the development of internal control systems and communication with information intermediaries such as analysts. This will enable external stakeholders to better understand the environmental governance measures adopted, thereby reducing regulatory compliance costs. Furthermore, local governments should enhance their commitment to environmental governance and mobilize public participation to actively advance the modernization of ecological and environmental development.