摘要：从会计政策选择的角度，考察了注册制下IPO公司研发支出会计信息质量是否有所提高。研究发现，相比核准制，注册制下IPO公司选择研发支出资本化的概率和资本化金额更高。机制分析表明，这种改变并非研发创新能力较强公司的信号传递行为，而是会计操纵的结果。进一步，注册制科创板公司可能出于满足利润和市值上市条件的目的，实施研发支出资本化操纵。异质性分析发现，国有企业在注册制下实施研发支出资本化操纵的行为更加严重；高质量审计、机构投资者和独立董事监督能够有效抑制IPO公司的资本化操纵行为。最后，注册制下IPO公司资本化水平越高，IPO定价效率和市场收益率越低。本文研究有助于深入理解注册制下研发支出会计信息的产生机制，同时从会计政策选择的角度，为加强上市公司研发支出会计信息监管和提升IPO信息披露质量提供有益参考。

Abstract: From the perspective of accounting policy choice, the paper examines whether the information quality of R&D expenditures of IPO companies has been improved under the registration system.We found that compared to the approval system, IPO companies under the registration system have a higher probability and amount of R&D expenditure capitalization.Mechanism analysis indicates that the change is not due to the signal transmission behavior of companies with higher innovation capabilities, but rather accounting manipulation behavior.Furthermore, IPO companies on the Science and Technology Innovation Board may implement manipulation of R&D expenditures capitalization in order to meet the listing conditions for profit and market value.Heterogeneity analysis reveals that state-owned enterprises engage in more severe manipulation of R&D expenditure capitalization under the registration system; high-quality auditing, institutional investors, and independent director supervision can effectively alleviate the capitalization manipulation behavior.Finally, the higher the capitalization level of IPO companies under the registration system, the lower the IPO pricing efficiency and market return.This study contributes to a deeper understanding of the mechanism behind the generation of accounting information for R&D expenditures under the registration system.And from the perspective of accounting policy choice, it provides useful references for strengthening the supervision of R&D expenditure information and improving the quality of IPO information disclosure.